

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 266812

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

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USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 266812

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DRAFTING OFFICE CORRECTED)

E.O. 11652: GDS

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SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 266812

TAGS: PARM,NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: SUGGESTED RESPONSE TO BELGIAN APPROACH

REF: STATE 249100

1. BEGIN FYI: THE BELGIAN ORAL PRESENTATION OF ITS VIEWS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF MBFR HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY A WRITTEN REITERATION (SEE REFTTEL). THE PRESENTATION IS PREMISED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN IMPASSE DETRIMENTAL TO ALLIED INTEREST EXISTS IN VIENNA AS A RESULT OF THE PHASING FOCUS AND ARGUES FOR AN IMMEDIATE SHIFT OF EMPHASIS BY THE ALLIES TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, THE CRUX OF THE ALLIED POSITION. WE BELIEVE A FULL US RESPONSE TO THE BELGIANS CAN HELP TO GAIN BELGIAN AND ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS WHICH THE US HAS INDICATED IT IS PREPARED TO MAKE. END FYI. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING NOTE IN RESPONSE. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT WE WANT THESE VIEWS CONSIDERED AT RELATIVELY HIGH LEVEL, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE NOTE BE DELIVERED TO DAVIGNON, IF POSSIBLE.

2. BEGIN TEXT. (COMPLIMENTARY OPENING) WE HAVE REVIEWED THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT'S THOUGHTFUL REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF MBFR, AS SET FORTH IN NOTE, P 15-95, N. 5982, DATED NOVEMBER 11, 1974, AND DELIVERED TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL BY MINISTER-COUNSELOR, ALFRED CAHEN. OUR BELIEF IS THAT THE EASTERN INITIAL STEP PROPOSAL HAS NOT CHANGED THE WARSAW PACT'S BASIC POSITIONS AND THAT THE EAST HAS NOT YET RESPONDED MEANINGFULLY TO THE ALLIED LINKAGE ASSURANCES. WHILE WE WANT TO MAINTAIN THE ALLIED POSITION THAT ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET, WE RECOGNIZE THAT A TENTATIVE UNDERSTANDING WITH THE EAST ON THIS SUBJECT, AS HOPED FOR BY THE ALLIES, IS UNLIKELY AT THIS TIME. ACCORDINGLY, IT MAY BE USEFUL TEMPORARILY TO FOCUS ON OTHER ISSUES AS THE AHG IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO DO IN VIENNA.

3. AS REGARDS THE COMMON CEILING THEME, THE US BELIEVES THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP A THREE ELEMENT
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 266812

APPROACH TO ADVANCE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT: EXCHANGE OF DATA, DISCUSSION OF GROUND FORCE ANOMALIES WITH A VIEW TO ARRIVING AT AN AGREED DEFINITION OF GROUND FORCES, AND DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF AIR MANPOWER. EACH OF THESE ELEMENTS CAN, WE BELIEVE, SERVE TO PROBE EASTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE COMMON CEILING IN A MANNER WHICH PROTECTS AND ADVANCES BASIC ALLIED POSITIONS. MOREOVER, SUCH AN APPROACH AVOIDS OR AT LEAST MINIMIZES IN OUR VIEW THE DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN A FRONTAL ATTACK ON THE EASTERN POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE COMMON CEILING. A DIRECT APPROACH

ON THE QUESTION PER SE MIGHT SERVE TO HARDEN THE SOVIET POSITION AND LEAD TO OUTRIGHT REJECTION OF THE CONCEPT. THE THREE ELEMENT APPROACH IS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A FULLER UNDERSTANDING BY THE EAST OF OUR BASIC CONCEPT AND THE REASONS UNDERLYING IT.

4. TWO PARTS OF THE THREE ELEMENT APPROACH HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADVANCED BY THE AHG IN VIENNA. (A) THE ALLIES HAVE OFFERED TO EXCHANGE ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS NUMERICAL DATA ON BOTH GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER. WHILE THE EAST HAS NOT AGREED AND HAS ARGUED THAT DATA EXCHANGE MUST FOLLOW AGREEMENT ON WHO AND WHICH FORCES, THE ALLIES HAVE INDICATED THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IS ABOUT EQUAL (WITH A SLIGHT ADVANTAGE TO THE PACT). THIS ALLIED APPROACH KEEPS THE EAST ON THE DEFENSIVE, SUGGESTS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY THE ALLIES ARE NOT SEEKING AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, AND SUPPORTS THE CASE FOR CONCENTRATION ON GROUND DISPARITIES IN REDUCTIONS. (B) THE ALLIED APPROACH ON GROUND FORCE RECATEGORIZATION ALREADY UNDERWAY IN VIENNA FURTHER BOLSTERS THE BASIC ALLIED CASE FOR THE COMMON CEILING. IN OFFERING TO CONSIDER A DIFFERENT DEFINITION WHICH ELIMINATES CERTAIN FUNCTIONAL ANOMALIES RESULTING FROM CLASSIFICATION BY UNIFORM, THE ALLIES PUSH THE DISCUSSION IN THE DIRECTION OF A FOCUS ON THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY. IN EFFECT, THEY ARE OFFERING TO NARROW THE DISPARITY IN RETURN FOR AN AGREED GROUND FORCE DEFINITION. THIS NARROWING COULD FURTHER ENHANCE THE POTENTIAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE COMMON CEILING TO THE EAST.

5. THE COMMON CEILING CAN ALSO BE ADVANCED BY EXPLORING
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 266812

WITH THE EAST THE IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN AIR ISSUES WHICH THEY HAVE RAISED. THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL ALLIED ARGUMENTS FOR THE COMMON CEILING -- THE NEED TO REDRESS EXISTING DISPARITIES AND THE NEED TO ACHIEVE AN OUTCOME TO MBFR WHICH WILL BE STABLE OVER THE LONG RUN -- BOTH LOGICALLY IMPLY TAKING ACCOUNT OF AIR FORCES IN SOME MANNER. ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF AIR MANPOWER, WHERE NO SIGNIFICANT DISPARITIES EXIST, WILL ENABLE THE ALLIES TO REINFORCE THEIR CONTENTION THAT GROUND FORCE DISPARITIES ARE THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN MILITARY INSTABILITIES AND THUS SERVE TO DRIVE DISCUSSIONS BACK TO THE COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

6. SINCE THE EAST APPEARED EARLIER TO SUGGEST THAT INCLUSION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER MIGHT MAKE THE COMMON CEILING MORE ACCEPTABLE, THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DRAW OUT EASTERN THINKING IN THE CONTEXT OF BEING RESPONSIVE TO THE EAST. THIS DISCUSSION WOULD PROVIDE A

BASIS FOR COUNTERING EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT DISPARITIES ARE AN ARTIFICIAL WESTERN CONSTRUCTION DERIVED FROM A SELECTIVE FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES ONLY. THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER TOTALS ON EACH SIDE WILL PROVIDE GREATER WEIGHT TO ALLIED ARGUMENTS TO KEEP THE FOCUS OF REDUCTIONS ON GROUND FORCES. A SEQUENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALLIED POSITION ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER WOULD ALSO DEMONSTRATE ALLIED REASONABLENESS AND WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE, PROVIDED THE SOVIET SIDE WILL MAKE CORRESPONDING MOVEMENT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE COMMON CEILING. SUCH A TACTIC COULD, WE BELIEVE, SERVE TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON THE EAST FOR SUBSTANTIAL MOVEMENT.

7. LIMITATIONS ON AIR MANPOWER COULD RESTRICT WARSAW PACT AIR FORCE READINESS MORE THAN ALLIED READINESS. SUCH LIMITATIONS MIGHT EVEN INTERFERE WITH THE CURRENT IMPROVEMENT OF PACT AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES THAT APPEARS TO BE OCCURRING IN THE NGA.

8. THE US IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT A MULTIPLE STEP ALLIED PRESENTATION ON AIR MANPOWER. THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THE POSSIBILITY OF A NON-INCREASE ASSURANCE ON AIR MANPOWER OF LIMITED DURATION. IN SUPPORT, THE ALLIES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 266812

HAVE ARGUED THAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IS NEARLY EQUAL; THAT, WHILE IT IS PERFECTLY LOGICAL TO LIMIT ONLY GROUND FORCE MANPOWER; THE WEST IS WILLING TO PLACE SOME LIMIT ON AIR MANPOWER; AND THAT IF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS NEARLY EQUAL AND IS ALSO PLACED UNDER SOME UPPER LIMIT, THEN THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY REMAINS THE PROBLEM TO BE DEALT WITH. NEXT, IF THE EAST CONTINUES TO SHOW AN INTEREST IN INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES, THE ALLIES COULD SUGGEST EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF THE COMMON CEILING TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER, PROVIDED THE EAST AGREES TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THIS WOULD INCREASE THE LOGIC OF THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND OF THE WESTERN ARGUMENTS ON ITS BEHALF. IT WOULD FORCE THE EAST TO ARGUE AGAINST PARITY ITSELF AND TO ABANDON THE ARGUMENT THAT THE ALLIES HAVE CONTRIVED THE SEPARATION OF GROUND FORCES IN ORDER TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE COMMON CEILING IN THIS MANNER CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT BY THE WEST TO AIR REDUCTIONS. NEXT, THE ALLIES COULD SUGGEST THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IN THE DATA BASE FOR COMPUTING PHASE I GROUND REDUCTIONS. THE EAST, HOWEVER, MAY CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT AIR FORCES BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. IN THIS CASE THE US WOULD BE PREPARED AFTER ALLIED CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF WITHDRAWING UP TO 15 PERCENT OF US AND SOVIET AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I. SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO

BE DEVELOPED WITHIN AN AIR/GROUND COMMON CEILING, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO OPTIONS FOR PHASE II TREATMENT OF AIR MAN-POWER, AND IN A MANNER WHICH RETAINS THE ALLIED GROUND FORCE REDUCTION GOALS.

9. THE US HOPES THAT THIS THREE ELEMENT ALLIED APPROACH ON THE COMMON CEILING CAN BE ADVANCED IN VIENNA DURING THE CURRENT SESSION AND HAS INITIATED DISCUSSIONS TOWARD THIS END IN APPROPRIATE NATO BODIES.
(COMPLIMENTARY CLOSING) END TEXT.

10. INFO ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON CONTENTS OF OUR RESPONSE AS APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER ALLIES. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: PM, TAKE AS ORGIN.

SECRET

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PAGE 06 STATE 266812

SECRET

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